Owners of husiness groups are oflen accused of expropriating minority shareholders hy tunneling resources from firms where they have low cash flow rights to firms where they have high cash flow rights. In this paper we propose a general methodology to measure the extent of tunneling activities. The methodology rests on isolating and then testing the distinctive implications of the tunneling hjfpothesis for the propagation of earnings shocks across flrms within a group. When we apply our methodology to data on Indian business groups, we flnd a signiflcant amount of tunneling, much of it occurring via nonoperating components of proflt.
I. INTRODUCTION
Weak corporate law and lax enforcement mechanisms raise fears of expropriation for minority shareholders around the world. These fears seem especially warranted in the presence of business groups, a common organizational form in many developed and developing countries. In a business group, a single shareholder (or a family) completely controls several independently traded firms and yet has significant cash fiow rights in only a few of them. ^ This discrepancy in cash flow rights between the different firms he controls creates strong incentives to expropriate. The controlling shareholder will want to transfer, or tunnel, profits across firms, moving them from firms where he has 122 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS low cash flow rights to firms where he has high cash flow rights.Ĉ ash can be transferred in many ways: the firms can give each other high (or low) interest rate loans, manipulate transfer prices, or sell assets to each other at above or below market prices, to list just a few. If prevalent, tunneling may have serious consequences. By reducing the returns to being an outside shareholder, it can hinder equity market growth and overall financial development. Illicit profit transfers may also reduce the transparency of the entire economy, clouding the accounting numbers and complicating any inference about firms' health. In fact, several observers argued that tunneling made it hard to assess solvency during the emerging market crises of [1997] [1998] , and possibly exacerbated the crisis.Â necdotes of tunneling are easy to find. In India, for example, one group firm, Kalyani Steels, had more than two-thirds of its net worth invested in other companies in its group. Yet these investments 5delded less than a 1 percent rate of return, fueling speculation that they were merely a way to tunnel profits out of Kalyani Steels. However, hard evidence of tunneling beyond anecdotes of this kind remains scarce, perhaps because of the illicit nature of this activity. The strongest statistical evidence so far is cross-sectional: group firms where the controlling shareholder has higher cash flow rights have higher q'-ratios and greater profitability.* While informative, this cross-sectional relationship is not a test of tunneling since it could also result from differences in preexisting efficiency or any number of other unobservable factors.
This paper introduces a general procedure to quantify tunneling. It is based on tracing the propagation of earnings shocks through a business group. Consider a group with two firms: firm H, where the controlling shareholder has high cash flow rights, and firm L, where he has low cash flow rights. Suppose that firm L experiences a shock that would (in the absence of tunneling) cause its profits to rise by 100 dollars. Because some of this increase will be tunneled out of firm L, the actual profits of firm L will rise by less than 100 dollars, with the shortfall measuring the amount of diversion. Since the shortfall is being tunneled to H, we would also expect H to respond to L's shock even though H is not directly affected by it. Moreover, we would not expect this pattern if instead H were to receive the shock: there is no incentive to tunnel from a high-to a low-cash-flow-rigbt firm.^ We develop a general set of tests based on these observations and use variation in mean industry performance as a source of profit shocks.Â s an illustration, we apply this test to a panel of Indian firms. We find evidence for the full set of predictions implied by tunneling. Other results suggest that these findings are not due to mismeasurement of a firm's industry, simple coinsurance within groups or internal capital markets. Moreover, the magnitudes of the effects we find are large: more than 25 percent of the marginal rupee of profits in low-cash-flow-right firms appears to be dissipated.Ô ur procedure further allows us to examine the mechanics of tunneling. Indian groups appear to tunnel by manipulating nonoperating components of profits (such as miscellaneous and nonrecurring items). In fact, there is no evidence of tunneling on operating profits alone. Ratber, nonoperating losses and gains seem to be used to offset real profit shocks or transfer casb from other firms. Finally, we examine whether market prices incorporate tunneling. We find tbat bigb market-to-book firms are more 5. This asymmetry is important. Money flows only from low-to high-cashflow-right firms, not vice versa. As we will see, this is a crucial distinction hetween tunneling and other theories of why shocks might propagate through a group, most notahly risk sharing.
6. Other papers have used shocks in a related way. Blanchard, Lopez-deSilanes, and Shleifer [1994] examine how U. S. firms respond to windfalls (winning a law suit) to assess agency models. Lamont [1997] uses the oil shock to assess the effects of cash flow on investment. Bertrand and Mullainathan [2001] use several shock measures to assess the effects of luck on CEO pay.
7. It is worth noting that husiness groups may add social value in other ways that offset the social costs they may impose through tunneling. They might help reduce transaction costs, solve external market failures, or provide reputational capital for their memhers. We will not, therefore, he attempting to test whether groups are on net had hut merely whether, and if so how much, they tunnel. sensitive to both tbeir own sbock and sbocks to the other firms in their group. Firms whose group has a high market-to-book are also more sensitive to their own shock, but are not significantly more sensitive to the group's shock. This suggests that the stock market at least partly penalizes tunneling activities.
II. A TEST FOR TUNNELING
We begin by describing the exact implications of tunneling for the propagation of shocks.^ Let us return to the fictional example of two group firms, high-cash-fiow-right firm H and low-cash-flow-right firm L. Consider again a lOO-doUar profits shock affecting firm L. Because the controlling shareholder would benefit more if these 100 dollars were in H, he will look for a way to divert them out of L. This gives the first prediction: group firms should on average underrespond to shocks to their own profits.
Of course, since tunneling may be costly (either because of resource dissipation or because of a risk of being caugbt), the controlling shareholder may transfer only some of the 100 dollars out of firm L. How much he transfers will be a function of bis cash flow rights in L. The less his cash flow rights in L, the less he values the extra dollar left in L and the more of the profits he will want to tunnel out of L. This gives the second prediction: the underresponse to shocks to own profits should be larger in lowcash-flow-right firms.
The cash tunneled from firm L eventually ends up in firm H. So H will appear to respond to L's shock even though H is not directly affected by L's shock. This gives the third prediction: group firms will on average be sensitive to sbocks affecting other firms in the group.Ŵ e know from above that when cash flow rights in firm L are low, more money will be tunneled out of L. But this also implies that more money will be tunneled into H when cash flow rights in L are low. This gives the fourth prediction: group firms will be more sensitive to shocks affecting low-cash-flow-right firms in their group than to shocks affecting high-cash-flow-right firms.
8. Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan [2000] present a model that formalizes these implications.
9. This prediction distinguishes tunneling from a pure mismanagement interpretation of the profits shortfall. The first two predictions could simply reflect a dissipation of resources through inefficient operation rather than a diversion to other group firms.
Finally, suppose that a lOO-doUar shock were now to affect firm H instead of firm L. Since the controlling shareholder has more cash flow rights in H than in L, he will have no incentives to tunnel from H to L. This means that H will respond one for one to its own shock, which is just another way to understand the second prediction above. It also means that L will not be sensitive to H's shock. A more general version of this observation gives the fifth prediction: low-cash-fiow-right firms will be less sensitive to shocks affecting other firms in their group.
To transform these general predictions into testable implications, we need to isolate specific shocks using available data. Industry shocks provide an ideal candidate since they affect individual firms but are to a large extent beyond the control of individual firms. Some notation will be helpful in defining these mean industry movements. Let perf,^fj be a level measure of reported performance for firm k in industry / at time t (in our case profits before depreciation, interest, and taxes). Akti be a measure ofthe firm ^'s assets (in our case, total book value of assets), and kti = Perfkti/Akti be a measure of return on assets for that firm.
To isolate the industry shock, we compute the asset-weighted average return for all firms in industry /: r^^ = E^ AktirkĴ k ^kti-^'^ Given this industry return, we can predict what firm 's performance ought to be in the absence of tunneling by calculating pred;^,;, = Akti * fitOur empirical test will then consist of regressing a firm's actual reported performance on its predicted performance and on the predicted performance of other firms in its group. ^^ More specifically, we can test the five implications above: (1) group firms should be less sensitive to shocks to their industry than nongroup (stand-alone) firms; (2) low-cash-fiow-right group firms will show smaller sensitivities to shocks to their industry than high-cash-fiow-right ones; (3) group firms should be sensitive to industry shocks affecting other firms in their group; (4) group firms should be especially sensitive to shocks affecting the low cash-fiow-right firms in their group; (5) low-cash-fiow-right group 10. A mechanical correlation arises if we include a firm itself in estimating its mdustry return and then use that industry return to predict the firm's own return. To prevent this, we exclude, for every firm, the firm itself in computing its industry return. In this sense, r^, should actually be indexed by /fe, but we drop this subscript for simplicity.
11. Given that this is a predicted level of performance, our terminology of shocks may seem inappropriate. But since we include firm fixed effects, we will in fact be identifydng the effect of industry shocks. firms should show smaller sensitivities in predictions 3 and 4. These five predictions form a simple test of tunneling, one that requires only firm-level data on earnings, industry, group membership, and ownership structure. ^Î
II. AN APPLICATION TO INDIAN BUSINESS GROUPS
We now apply this test to Indian data. As in many other covintries, group firms in India are often linked together through tbe ownership of equity shares. In most cases, the controlling shareholder is a family; among tbe best-known business families in India are Tata, Bajaj, Birla, Oberoi, and Mabindra.^N ominally, corporate governance laws in India are quite good, consistent with its English colonial past and its common law heritage [Sarkar and Sarkar 1999] . In reality, bowever, corruption makes tbese laws difficult to enforce and sbarebolder expropriation a major concern in India. In recent years the role of corporate governance in financial development has received significant attention from tbe Indian business press and central government. Business groups bave come tinder particular scrutiny for advancing their private interests at tbe expense of outside shareholders.^* Tunneling is also allegedly a problem.^^ Indeed, greater oversight of related party transactions was one of 12. A notable feature of these tests is their symmetry. One might have thought that there should be no tuimeling for negative groups. This is in fact not clear. For example, suppose that an industry earns a 10 percent natural rate of return and a negative shock reduces it to 5 percent. Since this reduces the amount that can be tunneled out, we will see just as much sensitivity to this shock (for example, among high-cash-flow-right group firms) as to a positive one. Rather than asymmetry in changes, one might expect that below some nominal rate of rettirn, tunneling would cease. A priori, it is unclear where this threshold lies. We tried some thresholds (e.g., zero nominal rate of return) and found standard errors that were too large to reject either linearity or significant nonhnearity. provide farther discussion of asymmetry.
13. Piramal [1996] and Dutta [1997] provide accounts of groups in India. 14. One Financial Times Asia article charges that the "boards of Indian companies, especially the family-owned ones, are prime examples of crony capitahsm. They are invariably filled with family members and friends. ... In such an environment, the promoter can operate to further his own interests even as he takes the other shareholders for a ride."
15. A 1998 Financial Times Asia article reports that "[c]hanneling funds to subsidiaries and group companies in the form of low or nil interest loans or low-jdeld investments is not new. Such a lockup of costly funds often results in poor financial performance. JCT, Kalyani Steels, Bombay Burmah Trading Company; and DCM Shriram Industries are examples. JCT's average return over the last four years on outstanding loans and advances of Rs. 270 crores is is just 4 percent. Similarly Kalyani Steels' 1996-97 investments in group companies was worth Rs. 196.80 crores-more than two-thirds its net worth-while the company earned just 1.45 crores as dividends." the specific recommendations made by a government committee organized to study corporate governance. ^^ Thus, with its weak corporate governance and allegations of impropriety, India provides an ideal location to test for tunneling.
III.A. Data Source
We use Prowess, a publicly available database maintained by the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE). Prowess includes annual report information for companies in India between 1989 and 1999. It provides much of the information needed for this analysis: financial statements, industry information, group affiliation for eacb firm, and some corporate ownership data. We exclude state-owned and foreign-owned firms from our sample since tbese may not be comparable to tbe private sector domestic firms that interest us. Our sample contains about 18,500 firmyear observations, although sample sizes vary because of missing variables for some firms. ^'
We rely on CMIE classification of firms into group and nongroup firms, and of group firms into specific group affiliation. CMIE classification is based on a "continuous monitoring of company announcements and a qualitative imderstanding of the groupwise bebavior of individual companies" (Prowess Users' Manual, v.2, p.4). Note also that CMIE assigns each company to a unique ownership group, based on the group most closely associated with that company. Conversations with local experts corroborate these classifications; which group a firm belongs to is widely known.
16. The Kumar Mangalam Committee recommended measures to strengthen t;he hoard of directors' role in "reducting] potential conflict between the specific interests of management smd the wider interests of the company and shareholders including misuse of corporate assets and ahuse in related party transactions." These measures included guidelines for strengthening the independence of hoards and for the estahlishment of £in audit committee hy the hoard of directors to review, among other things, "[ajny related party transactions, i.e. transactions of the company of material nature with promoters or the management, their suhsidiaries or relatives, etc. that may have potential conflict with the interests of the company at large."
17. Prowess does not use consolidated accounting data, which implies that our findings are not caused hy accounting mechanics. In fact, during the sample period under study, Indian accoiinting standards did not require disclosing consolidated accounts for group firms. Very few firms used consolidated fineincial statements in practice [Price, Waterhouse & Co. 1999] .
III.B. Measurement of Controlling Shareholder's Cash Flow
Rights A key variable in our analysis is tbe casb fiow rights of the controlling shareholder in a particular firm. There are two components to cash fiow rights. First are direct rigbts, wbich are derived from shares that tbe controlling shareholder (or his family) has in the company. Second are indirect rigbts, which are derived from shares held by anotber company in wbicb tbe controlling sbarebolder has some shares.
Prowess provides two reasonable proxies for direct casb fiow rights. Botb are derived from data on equity bolding patterns, which is available for about 60 percent of firms (all of tbem publicly traded). For tbese firms, CMIE reports the shares of equity held by foreigners, directors, various financial institutions, banks, various governmental bodies, the top fifty sharebolders, corporate bodies, and otbers.^Â s in many countries, Indian families typically control tbe firms tbey bave financial stakes in by appointing family members or family friends to tbe board of directors and to top managerial positions. Since tbe company sbares held by tbese board members benefit tbe controlling sbarebolder in some sense, tbe information on director ownersbip provides a first proxy for direct casb fiow Tbe equity beld by "otber shareholders," where others are defined as sbarebolders tbat are neitber directors, nor banks, nor foreigners, not financial institutions, nor government bodies, nor corporate bodies, nor tbe top fifty sbareholders, provides a second proxy. By measuring tbe sbares beld by small, minority sbare- 19. For example, the Financial THmes Asia reports that "the hoards of Indian companies . . . are invariahly filled with family members and friends, whether or not they are qualified for the position" IFinancial Times Asia Intelligence Wire, October 10, 1999] . The article goes on to say: "In such an environment, the promoter can operate to further his own interests even as he takes the other shareholders for a ride." Of course, if some of the directors are not family members or friends, this proxy will overstate the direct cash flow rights. bolders, it captures tbe amount of casb fiow rigbts tbe family does not own.^°A ltbougb botb variables are good proxies for direct casb fiow rigbts, tbey do little to capture indirect casb fiow rigbts. Because Prowess only provides information by ownersbip category, it is impossible to back out of sucb indirect casb fiow rigbts.^^ Consequently, our ranking of firms (in terms of casb fiow rigbts) witbin a group is noisy. For example, suppose tbat tbe ultimate owner owns 10 percent of firms A and B and firm B owns 40 percent in firm A. Tbe ultimate owner seemingly bas a 10 percent direct casb stake in botb firms but actually bas a 14 percent stake in firm A. If we modify tbe example so tbat the direct ownersbip stake in firm A is actually 9 percent, then adding indirect casb fiow rigbts reverses tbe ranking.^T bree points sbould be noted about tbis important measurement issue. First, indirect casb fiow rigbts by tbeir very nature sbould be smaller tban direct rigbts because they are diminished as tbey pass tbrougb tbe cbain of ownership. In tbe above example, despite tbe large indirect ownersbip of A by B (40 percent), the final difference is only 4 percent since A bas only a 10 percent direct stake in B. Moreover, wben our ranking of firms was wrong in tbe second example above, tbis was because botb B and A were very close in terms of direct casb fiow rigbts (10 percent versus 9 percent).^^ Second, to tbe extent tbat any significant error is introduced into our rankings of firms, there will be an attenuation bias. Tbis will bias our estimates toward zero, raise standard errors, and make it more difficult to find evidence of tunneling. Finally, altbougb tbese imperfect measures may make tbe CMIE 20. The two measures, the equity stake of directors and the equity stake held hy minority shareholders, correlate negatively. The correlation is imperfect, however, (about -.35 for group firms), suggesting that these are not redundant proxies. Besides measuring the ahsolute level of director and other equity holdings, we also measure their relative levels within each group. Finally, because we use within-group differences in director and other ownership levels to identify the direction and magnitude of money flows across firms in a business group, we exclude from the sample all groups where there is no difference hetween the maximum and the minimum level of direct ownership or hetween the maximum and minimum level of other ownership.
21. Indian disclosure laws do not mandate release of this information. We have attempted to gather this information in many other ways, from investment bankers to the groups themselves; our attempts have heen fruitless.
22. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for providing variants of these examples.
23. This is not to say that one cannot construct exaniples where indicted ownership matters, but rather that because of the multiplication by the direct ownership in firms, indirect ownership will have on average a smaller effect on cash fiow rights. data a less than perfect place to apply our test, it is highly representative of tbe typical data available to implement our test in most countries. Detailed data on ownersbip between firms are usually bard to get, whereas many countries have readily available categorical ownersbip data of tbe kind provided by CMIE.
C. Measurement of Performance
Tbe CMIE data were collected witb a focus on accounting numbers. Consequently, we cannot use it to compute reliable annual stock return measures for many firms between 1989 and 1999. More specifically, we lack dividend data for many observations, which is especially troubling since dividend payments would be tbe most direct way for a controlling sbarebolder to affect final retums.^^ Moreover, comparisons witb botb aggregate data and data on specific firms from tbe Bombay Stock Excbange sbow tbat tbe stock prices reported on CMIE are tbemselves noisy. In several cases, tbe returns we computed lagged or led true returns.^^ Tbese problems constrain us to use tbe more reliable "profits before depreciation, interest and tax" as our specific performance measure, perf^^j. Our asset measure, Assetsi^ti, is total assets. Eacb firm's industry comes from CMIE's classification of firms into industries. Our sample contains 134 different "four-digit" industries.^7 Table I reports summary statistics for tbe full sample and for group and nongroup firms separately. In this table, and throughout the remainder of tbe paper, nongroup firms are referred to as "stand-alones." Group firms and stand-alones, respectively, account for about 7,500 and 11,000 of tbe observations in our full sample. All nominal variables in tbe sample are defiated using 24. By examining the firms with some, not necessarily reliahle dividend data, we see that dividends are a sizahle fraction of returns.
D. Summary Statistics
25. Despite the noisiness, we did estimate the regressions below using market value as a dependent variable, and the results are quite similar. But, because of ths noisiness of the data, we do not have great faith in these results. They are availahle as Tahle B in the unpublished appendix, available from the authors upon request. The average level of market capitalization appears much more reliahle, however, and we use it in suhsection IV.B. to relate q ratios to the extent of tunneling.
26. They can he found in Tahle A of the appendix availahle from the authors upon request. The hreakdown is at roughly the level of the four-digit SIC code in the United States. b. Standard deviations are in parentheses. c. "Operating profit" refers to manufacturing sales revenue minus total raw material expenses, energy expenses, and wages and salaries, 'q ratio" is the ratio of market valuation to total assets. "Director equity spread" is the difference between the minimum and maximum level of director equity in a group; "Other ownership spread" is the difference between the minimum and maximum level of other ownership in a group. Ownership and ownership spread variables are measured in percentages and so range from 0 to 100. the Consumer Price Index series from the International Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund (1995 = 100).
The average group firm in the sample belongs to a group with fifteen firms. Many groups in our data, however, consist of two or three firms.^^ Group firms are, on average, twelve years older than nongroup firms: the typical group firm was created in 1967, 27. Some ownership groups have several smaller companies that are set up for taxation or retail business purposes. It is much more difficult for CMIE to get access to the annual reports of these smaller companies. CMIE also tracks sub- the typical stand-alone firm in 1979. More importantly, group firms tend to be much larger than stand-alones. The average group firm has total assets of Rs. 253 crores, while the average stand-alone has total assets of Rs. 52 crores. Stand-alones also have lower levels of sales and profits. We will control for these size and age differences in our analysis. The average level of director ownership among group firms is 7.5 percent. The average level of ownership by other shareholders is 27.5 percent. The gap in director ownership between the top and bottom of a group (i.e., the gap between the firm with the highest level of director ownership and the firm with the lowest level of director ownership) is 15 percent on average. The average gap in other ownership is 33 percent.
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III.E. Sensitivity to Own Shock
In Table II we test the first prediction of tunneling: group firms should be less sensitive to shocks to their own industry than stand-alones. We estimate sidiary companies with small turnover hut does not include them in the datahase we use in this paper.
(1) perfk, = a + bipred^,) + c{groupk * + d{controlskt) + Firm/, + where group^ is a dummy variable for whether firm A is in a group or not, controls^t are other variables that might affeet firm performance (specifically age and log assets), Firm^ are firm fixed effects, and Timef are time dummies.^® The coefficient b measures the general sensitivity of firms to industry performance; the interaction term^roap;^ * pred/^t captures the differential sensitivity of group firms. If group firms are less sensitive, as tunneling would predict, then c should be negative. Note that because the regression is expressed in performance levels, the magnitude of the effects can easily be interpreted. Column (1) displays our basic result. A one-rupee shock leads to about a one-rupee (1.05) increase in earnings for a stand-alone firm. For a group firm, it leads to .3 rupee smaller increase, or only a .75 rupee increase.^^ This suggests that 30 percent of all the money placed into a group firm is somehow dissipated.
In Table I we saw that stand-alone firms are smaller and older on average than group firms. This could confound our estimate of the effect of group affiliation if size or age affects a firm's responsiveness to shocks. In column (2) we include an interaction between the logarithm of total assets and the industry shock. In column (3) we do the same for age. In column (4) we include both interactions simultaneously. The direct effects are always included. From these, it is clear that both size and age do affect the responsiveness to shocks. But it is also clear that the difference between group and stand-alone firms remains significant even in the presence of additional controls.^" In short, the data support the first prediction.
28. The inclusion of firm fixed effects deals with several issues. First, even though we are using level of predicted performance, we are identifying off of changes in predicted performance, hence our use of the term "shocks" throughout the paper. Second, the fixed effects account for any inherent, fixed differences hetween firms. Third, because firms do not change groups in our sample, the firm fixed effects also account for any fixed differences between groups.
29. We have also estimated this euid all regressions below excluding small groups, which we define as groups with less than five firms in the CMIE data. The results were not affected when we restrict ourselves to that subsample.
30. We have also attempted more flexible specifications by allowing for more nonlinear terms for size and age in the interaction. These produced identical results.
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The second prediction provides a more stringent test: withingroup firms, high-cash-flow-right firms should show greater sensitivity to own shocks. We estimate for the set of group firms (2) perfkt = a + bipred^t) + cicashk * + Firm^ + i, where cash^ is the cash flow rights of the controlling party in firm k, measured either with director or other ownership. The interaction term, cash/^ * pred^t, measures differential sensitivity hy level of cash flow rights. Under the tunneling hypothesis, we would expect c > 0.^P anel A of Tahle III uses director equity as the proxy for cash flow rights. Column (1) shows that group firms where director equity is higher are more sensitive to their own industry shock. Each one-percentage point increase in director equity increases the sensitivity to a one-rupee industry shock hy .03 rupee. Recall that among group firms, the average difference in director ownership hetween the firm with the greatest and the firm with the lowest director ownership was ahout 15. Thus, for each rupee of industry shock, the typical firm with the highest director ownership is .45 rupee more sensitive than the typical firm with the lowest director ownership. This suggests that group firms with high controlling party's cash fiow rights may he as sensitive to the marginal rupee as stand-alone firms. The magnitude of this effect is striking and suggests that ownership plays a large role in the extent of the sensitivity.
To assess whether the findings in column (1) capture some aspects of director ownership that are unrelated to group memhership, we reestimate equation (2) in column (3) on the suhsample of stand-alone firms. We find that director ownership also increases the responsiveness to shocks for stand-alone firms. The effect, however, is quantitatively much smaller, only a sixth of the size of the effect for group firms (.004 versus .025 for group firms).
In columns (2) smd (4) we allow for the effect of own industry shock to differ hy firm size and firm age. These additional controls do not alter the estimated coefficient on "Own shock • director equity" for the sample of group firms (column (2)). They do, however, lead to an increase in the coefficient on "Own shock • 31. When we use "Other ownership" in the interaction, we expect a negative term since this measure is negatively related to cash flow rights. director equity" in the sample of stand-alone firms (.019 instead of .004). Because standard errors are relatively small, we can still reject that the effect of director ownership on industry shock sensitivity is the same hetween group firms and stand-alone firms. More director equity increases the responsiveness of a firm to its own industry shock, and this effect is significantly larger among group firms. In Panel B of Tahle III we use our other proxy for direct cash fiow rights, the ownership stake of other small shareholders. As predicted, we find that the sensitivity of a group firm to its own industry shock decreases with its level of other ownership. A one-percentage point increase in other ownership decreases the responsiveness of a group firm to a one-rupee shock hy ahout .01 rupee (column (1)). Given that the average spread hetween highest and lowest other ownership among group firms is ahout 33, the implied magnitude of the effect is the same as in Panel A. Among stand-alone firms (column (3)) the effect of other ownership is of the opposite sign and economically small. Finally, note that the coefficient on "Own shock • other ownership" is roughly unaffected hy the inclusion of controls for firm age and firm size interacted with own industry shock (columns (2) and (4) for group and stand-alone firms, respectively).
In summary, these results in Tahle III are consistent with the idea that fewer resources are tunneled out of the group firms where the promoting family has higher equity stakes and where there are fewer minority shareholders to expropriate. In fact, group firms where the controlling party has a large stake show the same sensitivity to their own industry shocks as stand-alone firms.
III.F. Sensitivity to Group Shocks
We now examine whether a firm responds to shocks affecting other firms in its group (prediction 3). We estimate
where opred/^^ = ^j^k P^^dj^, the sum heing over all other firms in the same business group (excluding the firm itself). A positive b. Sample is group firms only. c. "Shock below median (director equity)" is a variable that sums the industry shocks to all the firms in the same group (excluding the firm itself) that have below median level of director ownership in their group. All the other subgroup shocks are defined accordingly.
d. Also included in each regression are the logarithm of total assets, year fixed effects, and firm fixed effects.
e. Standard errors are in parentheses.
coefficient on opred^t suggests that firms within a group are in fact sensitive to each other's shocks.^Î n column (1) of Table IV we find a moderate response of group firms to each other's shocks. The coefficient on "Group shock" of .011 suggests that for each rupee earned by the group, an average firm in the group receives .011 rupee. Since we know that group firms underreact by about 1 -.73 = .27 rupee to a 32. Note that we control for the firm's own shock, pred,^,. This control means that we do not confuse an overlap of industry between firms in the same group with a fiow of cash within that group. one-rupee shock and since there are about fifteen firms in each group, this coefficient implies that about 61 percent of the money that is tunneled out reappears elsewhere in tbe group.^T he next prediction of tunneling (prediction 4) is tbat the source of the shock matters: firms should respond more to groups affecting low-cash-fiow-right firms than to groups affecting highcash-fiow-right firms. We study this prediction in columns (2) to (5). We define Hopred/^f as the sum of shocks affecting all high cash-fiow-right firms in k's group and Lopred^t as the equivalent sum for low-cash-flow-right firms. We then estimate (4) perfi,, = a + bipred^d + CiJJLopredkt) + + d{controlskt) + Firm^ + Ti If group firms are in fact more sensitive to groups to the firms with low cash fiow rights, we should find that c^, > c^.
In column (2) we classify a group's flrms as low-or bigh-cashfiow-right using the median director equity in that group as a threshold. We flnd that firms show greater sensitivity to shocks affecting tbe low-cash-fiow-right firms in their group. A one-rupee shock to firms below group median in terms of director ownership increases the average group firm's earnings by .02 rupee. By contrast, the average group firm's earnings do not respond to industry shocks to firms in the high-cash-flow-rigbt group. Column (3) instead contrasts shocks to firms below and above the sixty-sixth percentile of director equity in their group. This isolates a smaller group of firms in the higb-cash-flow-rigbt group and allows resources to be equally skimmed from a larger number of flrms. The results are very similar.
In column (4) we classify a group's firms as low-or bigb-cashflow-right using the median other shareholders' equity in that group as a threshold. In this case, we find that the average group firm is equally sensitive to shocks to the two subgroups. In column (5) we isolate a larger set of firms with low cash flow rights by using the thirty-third percentile of other shareholders' equity as the breaking point. The results suggest that few to no resources are transferred from the subgroup of firms with low levels of other equity. In contrast, tbe coefficient on the shock to firms 33. The remaining 39 percent may be a dissipation factor, suggesting real costs of redistribution. Alternatively, it may reflect redistribution to firms that are not in our sample. Most notably, tunneling may occur through nonpublic firms such as holding companies, which are not represented in our data set. b. Firms are separated into different "Level in group" based on their within-group level of director equity. For example, "Topmost Firm" are the set of firms that have the highest level of director ownership in their group.
c. Also included in each regression are the logarithm of total assets, year fixed effects, and firm fixed effects.
d. Standard errors are in parentheses.
with high levels of other equity is large (about .02) and statistically significant. These results complement the findings in Table  III : not only are more resources "disappearing" from low-cashfiow right firms, these resources are also the ones more likely to "show up" elsewhere in the group.
III.G. Does Money Go to the Top?
In Table V we test the final prediction of tunneling: resources should disproportionately flow toward high-cash-flow-right firms. We rank firms based on their within-group level of director equity and construct four different subsamples: firms with below the sixty-sixth percentile of director equity in their group, firms with above the sixty-sixth percentile of director equity in their group, firms with strictly less than the highest level of director equity in their group, and firms with the highest level of director equity in their group. We compare sensitivity to group shocks £ind sub-group shocks for firms in the four different samples by reestimating equations (3) and (4) separately for these samples. In addition to the variables reported in the table, each regression includes the logarithm of total assets, year fixed effects, and firm fixed effects. The dependent variable in all regressions is still profit before depreciation, interest, and taxes.
When we contrast firms above £ind below the sixty-sixth percentile in director equity (columns (1) and (2)), we find no statistically significant differences in their sensitivity to the overall group shock. In fact, the point estimate on "Group shock" is higher for firms with low levels of director ownership (.013 versus .010).^^ In columns (3) to (6), we contrast the sensitivity to the group shock for the firms with the highest level of director ownership in their group compared with that for all other firms in the group. With this split of the data, the theoretically expected patterns emerge. Firms at the very top gain about .02 rupee for every one-rupee shock to their group (column (6)). All the other firms gain only .012 rupee for the same one-rupee shock (column (3)). Because standard errors are rather large in column (6), however, these two estimates are not statistically different.
Interestingly, when we break down the overall group shock into two subshocks, the results become even more suggestive. We find that top firms gain between .032 and .034 rupee for every one-rupee shock to group firms either below the sixty-sixth percentile in terms of director equity or above the thirty-third percentile in terms of other ownership (columns (7) and (8)). All the other firms gain between .015 and .017 rupee on average for the same subshocks (columns (4) and (5)). To summarize, these results give some evidence that the firms with the highest level of director equity in their group seem to benefit most from shocks to the rest ofthe group. Moreover, these firms benefit the most from shocks to firms with low director equity or higher other shareholders' ownership.
III.H. Alternative Explanations
Although these findings match the predictions of the tunneling hypothesis, other possible explanations need to be considered.^^ First, suppose that group firms are more diversified than 34 . Similar results follow if we use median cutoffs. 35. A purely mechanical explanation could be that cross-ownership between firms generate dividend payments that look like tunneling. This effect, however, stand-alones and low-casb-flow-rigbt ones are more diversified tban bigh-cash-fiow-rigbt ones. Then tbe reduced sensitivity to tbe industry sbock could reflect mismeasurement of tbese firms' industries. We investigate tbese questions directly by using detailed product data to construct diversification measures. For tbese measures, we find no difference between group and nongroup firms. Nor do we find any difference between high-and low-easb-fiow-right group firms in the extent of their diversification. This suggests that differences in industry mismeasurement do not drive our findings.^Â nother possibility is that coinsurance between group firms generates both reduced sensitivity to own shock and redistribution between firms. Such coinsurance may be common in countries such as India, where capital markets are still nascent [Khanna and Palepu 2000] . Insurance may also take a financing form in which a rich group firm invests in other firms' products, essentially forming a groupwide internal capital market. A simple coinsurance scheme, however, could not generate all of our results. Specifically, why do high-cash-fiow-right firms systematically receive less insurance or financing? More generally, why does cash fiow in only one direction, from low-to high-cash-fiowright firms?
For an insurance story to accommodate our findings, highcash-fiow-right firms within a group would have to be better providers of insurance or financing. We test this hj^othesis in several ways and find no evidence for it. First, we find no difference in cash richness (a proxy for ease of insurance provision) between high-and low-cash-fiow-right group firms. Second, we find that adding an interaction of industry cash richness with the various shoek measures does not affect the results. Finally, to examine the possibility that these results refiect internal capital markets, we control for the extent of borrowing between firms in a group. This also does not affect the results. As a whole, we find little support for these alternative explanations.
be too small to explain our results. Moreover, our results do not ehange when we exclude "earnings from dividends" from our measure of earnings.
36. All the results in this section are described in detail in Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan [2000] as well as in Tables C and D of the unpublished  appendix. 142 b. Each coefficient contains the result of a separate regression in which the dependent variable is either operating profits or nonoperating profits, as indicated. In Panel A the reported coefficient is the coefficient on "Own shock." In Panel B the reported coefficient is the coefficient on "Own shock • director equity." In Panel C, the reported coefficient is the coefficient on "Group Shock." Also indicated in each regression are the logarithm of total assets, year fixed effects, firm fixed effects, and "Own shock" (Panels B and C).
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c. In Panel C the subsamples are for group firms only. Topmost firm and below topmost firms are defined using director's equity. For example, "Topmost firm" are the set of firms that have the highest level of director ownership in their group.
rv. OTHER RESULTS
IV.A. An Accounting Decomposition
If business groups in India are indeed tunneling resources, as the evidence so far strongly suggests, how are they doing it? We address this question in Table VI where we replicate the previous analysis but replace our standard profits measure with other balance sheet items. More formally, we decompose profits into two components. Profits = Operating Profits + Nonoperating Profits. Operating profits are defined as sales minus total raw material expenses minus energy expenses minus wages and salaries.^^ Nonoperating profits are the "residual." They include such diverse items as write-offs for had debts, interest income, amortization, extraordinary items, and unspecified items.
Panel A of Table VI compares the sensitivity of group and stand-alone firms to their own shock for these two measures (as in Table II ). Each entry in this panel is the coefficient on "Own shock" from a separate regression. We see in the first row that group firms' operating profits are, if anything, more sensitive to their own industry shock. ^® It is on nonoperating profits that group firms are far less sensitive to their own shock. More specifically, nonoperating profits seem to fall when there is a positive shock to a firm's industry. Although nonoperating profits decline moderately in stand-alone firms, the fall is much larger for group firms.
In Panel B we examine the differential sensitivity to own industry shock hy the controlling party's cash fiow rights (as in Table III ). Each entry in this panel belongs to a separate regression. For simplicity, we only report in this table the coefficient on "Own shock * director equity." Each regression also includes the logarithm of total assets, firm fixed effects, year fixed effects, and the direct effect of "Own shock." As a benchmark, we report in the second column the equivalent regressions for stand-alone firms. The first row shows that there is little evidence of tunneling in operating profits. While group firms' sensitivity rises with director equity, stand-alone firms show a nearly equivalent rise. The difference is only about .004. In the second row, however, we see a much greater effect on nonoperating profits. The difference between group and stand-alone firms is around .017, or four times the difference on operating profits.
In Panel C we examine how each of the two profit measures respond to the group shock (as in Tahle V). Each entry represents the coefficient on "Group shock" from a separate regression which includes year and firm fixed effects, the logarithm of total assets. 37. Total raw material expenses include raw material expenses, stores and spares, packaging expenses, and pxirchase of finished goods for resale.
38. In all regressions in Table VI , the shock measiire relates as before to total industry profits (operating and nonoperating). So, the shock measures have not changed, only the dependent variables have. and own shock. These results complement those of Panels A and B since they tell us about the mechanisms for tunneling money into a firm. We find a pattern very similar to that in Panels A and B. Much ofthe differential sensitivity of high-and low-cash-fiowright firms to the group shock occurs on nonoperating profits.
Hence, according to the findings in Tahle VI, the tunneling of money both into and out of firms in India occurs through nonoperating profits.^^ This implies that transfer pricing (which would affect operating profits) is not an important source of tunneling in India. Moreover, it suggests that nonoperating profits may be a force that moves in the opposite direction of operating profits and serves to dampen final earnings. In unreported regressions, we examine this by simply regressing a firm's nonoperating profits on its operating profits, while controlling for size, year dummies, and firm fixed effects. As expected, we find a strong negative coefficient. When we interact operating profits in this regression with a variety of variables, we find results quite similar to our tunneling findings. Group firms show a much more negative relationship between operating and nonoperating profits. Also, among group firms, the ones with low cash flow rights show the most negative relationship. This evidence reinforces the view that manipulation of nonoperating profits is a primary means of removing cash from and placing cash into group firms in India.
rV.B. Market Valuation
Given our findings so far, it is natural to ask whether stock prices reflect the extent of this tunneling. Does the market penalize flrms or groups which show more evidence of tunneling? To address this issue, we compute for each firms an average "q" ratio. We do this by first regressing standard firm level marketto-book ratios on log(total assets), year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and firm fixed effects. The value of the firm fixed effect in this regression is the variable we call "Firm Q." Our q measure is, therefore, the market premium for the firm relative to other firms in its industry, size class, and year. We also compute an average q ratio for each group. To do this, we estimate a similar regression at the firm level but include group fixed effects instead of firm fixed effects. The group fixed effects from these 39. We have attempted further decomposition of nonoperating profits and found no consistent pattern. No one subcomponent of nonoperating profits is systematically more important. This may be because different firms tunnel in different ways. b. Sample is group firms only. c. "Firm Q" is a variable that represents the estimated firm fixed effects in a regression of firm-level q ratios (market valuation over total assets) on log(total assets), year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and firm fixed effects. "Group Q" is a variable that represents the estimated group fixed effects in a regression of firm-level q ratios on log(total assets), year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and group fixed effects. "Relative Q" is the difference between "Firm Q" and the mean of "Firm Q" within groups.
d. Also included in eacb regression are the logarithm of total assets, year fixed effects, and firm fixed effects.
regressions define the variable we call "Group Q." Finally, we form a "Relative Q" measure for each firm, which equals its own q minus its group q, and captures a firm's performance relative to the rest of the group. In Table VII we examine how these new variables influence the sensitivity of a firm to its own shock and to the group shock. In column (1) we show that firms with higher q are more sensitive to both their own shock and to the group shock. Under the tunneling interpretation, this suggests that firms that have more money transferred to them and less money taken away from them have higher q ratios. In column (3) we see the same pattern for relative q. In column (3) we see that the groups with the highest q ratios are those with firms that show higher sensitivity to their own shock, and thus have less money taken away from them. The coefficient on group shock interacted with "Group Q" is positive but insignificant. In column (4) we include interactions of the shock measures with hoth "Firm Q" and "Group Q." The results are qualitatively similar.
The findings in this section suggest that the stock market (at least partly) recognizes tunneling and incorporates it into pricing. Firms that have more resources tunneled to them are valued more hy the market. Firms that have less money tunneled away from them are also valued more. Finally, groups that tunnel less money are valued more. These results complement previous empirical findings that market valuations positively correlate with the controlling shareholders' cash fiow rights."*" V. CONCLUSION We have developed a fairly general empirical methodology for quantifying tunneling in business groups. We examined whether shocks propagate between firms in a business group in accord with the controlling shareholder's ownership in each firm. We applied the methodology in Indian data and found significant amounts of tunneling, mostly via nonoperating components of profits. We also found that market prices partly incorporate tunneling.
These results raise some questions. If groups expropriate minority shareholders so much, how do they persist? Why do minority shareholders buy into them in the first place? We feel that there are three broad possibilities. First, groups may grow through acquisitions. If this is the case, and markets are efficient, then the act of takeover would generate a one-time drop in share price amounting to the extent of tunneling. Second, shareholders may not recognize the extent of tunneling that takes place in groups. For example, the lack of detailed ownership information may make it difficult for shareholders to figure out with great reliability which group firms are high-and which are low-cashflow-right firms. Finally, groups may provide other benefits, which offset the costs imposed by tunneling. To cite one example, they may provide important political contacts, which are quite 40. For example, Bitinchi, Bianco, and Enriques [1999] , Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang [1999] , and Claessens, Djankov, and Lang [2000] ). In the Indian data we find that firms with a higher level of other equity within a group have a lower q ratio. We do not, however, find a significant relationship between level of director ownership and q ratio within groups.
FERRETING OUT TUNNELING
147
valuable in a heavily regulated economy. Given the extent of turmeling found here, assessing the relevance of each of these possibilities appears to be an important direction for future research. 
